Tuesday, 30 December 2014

Community the new buzz word!


The Power of a community

Creating a community is no easy task, it takes time, effort and consistency which is why those who are successful at it reap enormous rewards.

There are three main striking advantages to creating a solid community:


1. Those in the community will strive to see your business succeed and hence exert time and effort helping you and your business. Those are the type of people who continuously give constructive feedback, constantly sing the praise of your business to others and essentially act as ambassadors.
Members here will recruit others into the community.

2. Many businesses attempt to reinvent the wheel, here is an idea, why don't we take an idea that already exists and do it better than any other competitor? how? by seeking the advice and involvement of the community for product development. Organisations that are close to their customers have a higher success rate when introducing new products because the chances are that they are able to produce a product that exactly fulfils the customer's requirement. Too many businesses attempt to acquire new customers without talking to or listening the ones they already have, having to constantly commit resources to acquisition. It is at least a third cheaper to maintain a customer to acquire one.
The bucket theory suggests that you keep pouring new customers at the top while the existing ones keep escaping from the holes in the bucket, those holes can be closed by offering a good quality service and a product customers actually want.

3. In times of hardship or in times when the business requires support, the community is where that support is likely to come from. If the business wants to launch a new product and needs people to talk about it, it's the community that will spread the word.


Employees that can build communities for the business play a central role, it is often perpetuated that customers enjoy building a relationship with at least one employee as they enjoy the comfort of dealing with one person who understands their requirements. Hence encouraging customer facing employees in building solid relationships that pour directly into the larger community of the organisation is essential.

Google has been known to recruit for attitude and train for skill, nowhere does this hold more true than when recruiting those that are in customer facing roles and have the potential of expanding the community the organisation is likely to heavily rely on.

Building a community is a skill not to be underestimated and recruiters should prioritise it.

Defensive Marketing

Introduction
Customer satisfaction is a multidimensional concept that is derived from technical satisfaction of the product/service as well as the emotional fulfilment of the customer’s requirements. What some customers perceive as satisfactory others may not, therefore defensive marketing although important it should be coupled with other strategies to ensure overall customer satisfaction.
Defensive marketing 
When a firm aims to keep its current customers defensive marketing is the approach it undertakes, it is a strategy that is directly concerned with minimising customer defection (Fornell & Wernerfelt 1987, p.337). 
A firm therefore needs to analyse every aspect of the customers’ satisfaction requirement in order to maintain their patronage, however in being focused on satisfying only current customers a firm may limit the firm’s ability to innovate and move with time hence leading to an ultimate dissatisfaction of current customers as they realise that other more superior options have come on to the market. Customers do not always know that they will develop a need for something. 
Take Nokia as an example, while it successfully dominated the handset market and kept its customers satisfied through a defensive strategy and innovations in the handset market it failed to respond to the blackberry and iPhone innovations (Clark, 2009) hence seeing customers defect to try the new technology even though they may have been satisfied thus far by Nokia.  A defensive marketing strategy can go so far, other marketing strategies need to also be implemented. As Wilson et al. (2012, p. 433) further asserts, a marketing strategy that incorporates innovation and learning is essential to maintain current customers as it’s creates more value for customers by improving operating efficiencies 
Defensive marketing is also a technique employed to mitigate the harmful and negative impact of dissatisfied customers (Fornell & Wernerfelt 1987, p.338) therefore it eludes to the fact that customers through the operation or services could have become dissatisfied and hence the need to redeem the reputation of the firm.  As Wilson et. al. (2012, p.424) mentions providing consistently good service is hard to do and hard to duplicate hence at any point the firm fails to provide good service , customer dissatisfaction may occur.  It is therefore vital to ensure that a firm delivers on its promises in order to realise customer satisfaction (Wilson et. al. 2012, p.317) therefore the need for collaboration between the advertised message and the delivered service to ensure ultimate customer satisfaction.
Lastly, customer satisfaction may occur from a relationship with the firm and/or some employees in the firm.  Employees can directly affect customer satisfaction and they are considered a marketing tool, they are “...walking billboards from a promotional standpoint” (Wilson et al. 2012, p250) hence ensuring that they are aligned with the overall marketing strategy of the organisation where customer satisfaction is central, ensures that they behave in the right manner to realise customer satisfaction. Luo, Kanuri & Andrews (2014, p.509) assert those firms that are unable to foster a relationship between employees and customer experience decline in return ;  this can be directly associated with decreased customer satisfaction.

 Conclusion
Customer satisfaction cannot be best realised through one type of marketing strategy but through a vision of the firm that is focused on the customer which includes defensive marketing. Satisfaction could come from various places in the firm, the product, the employees, the service, brand image and so forth. Therefore, ensuring all those aspects are aligned delivering the same message through different strategies will ultimately lead to customer satisfaction.

References:


Fornell, C, & Wernerfelt, B (1987), 'Defensive Marketing Strategy by Customer Complaint Management: A Theoretical Analysis', Journal Of Marketing Research (JMR), 24 (4), pp. 337-346 [online]. Available from: http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.liv.ac.uk/eds/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=ef1f38be-f7e1-49b9-bfb6-de6991a6f2ac%40sessionmgr110&hid=104&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=5004726 (Accessed 18th September 2014)


Luo, X., Kanuri, V. & Andrews, M. (2014), 'How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm-employee and firm-customer relationships', Strategic Management Journal, 35(4) pp. 492-511 [online]. Available from: http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.liv.ac.uk/eds/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=7695ddbe-0b06-4931-af58-50abc7dcab36%40sessionmgr112&hid=104&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=94801446 (Accessed 18th September 2014)



Wilson, A., Zeithaml, V. A., Bitner M. and Gremler, D., (2012), Services Marketing: Integrating Customer Focus Across the Firm, Second European Edition. Maidenhead: McGraw Hill

Although a bumpy road at times: Suzuki remains successful in India!



Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to assess Suzuki’s key strategic decisions surrounding its entrance into the Indian market. 
For the purpose of this paper an outlook and analysis of the four wheel segment will be undertaken. The two wheel segment, which constitutes a large portion of sales in India, will not be analysed in this report.
The paper will discuss the automobile industry in general in the Indian market with some relevant facts; it will then narrow the focus on to Maruti-Suzuki and discuss the Joint venture between the Indian government and the Japanese car maker Suzuki.
An emerging market, India has much to offer on the stance of complex regulatory, economically, socially and politically motivated aspects of any business entrance. Those influencing factors will be discussed in detail with a final connection to adaptation of this framework by the Japanese car maker.
Analyses of the successes and the failures Suzuki made in its operations in India will be undertaken. How successful are its successes, how deep are its failures and how did it reconcile its periods of ugliness it became famous for at some point.
Throughout the paper conclusions surrounding the organisation’s entry into the Indian market place will be derived from the factors discussed, had it chosen the right entry method? Had it leveraged its government connections? and how is it viewed by its stakeholders and are those views conducive to substantial negative or positive impact on the organisation’s profits or market share. 

The Automotive Industry today - India
In a country with a large manufacturing sector, the automotive industry is one of the largest and fastest growing with vehicle production almost doubling in the five years leading to fiscal year 2010/2011 (Bardalai & Nicholls 2012, p.3). 
The opportunities presented in this segment are enormous for the automotive industry especially with the increasing wealth in India and economic downturn in other parts of the world. The liberalisation of the economy in the 90’s drove the country to a market-based economy where FDI started flooding in to serve the second most populous country in the world. These market characteristics eventually led to India’s ranking as the fourth largest world economy by GDP measured by purchasing power parity following EU,US, China (The World Fact Book, 2012). The automaker represented a high spillover effect and hence represented a compelling case for government support, hence licensing was lifted and foreign car manufactures where then able to enter India as wholly owned subsidiaries. Foreign car manufacturers increased in India not only to serve the growing demand in the Indian market but they soon realised the merit in exporting out of India to Asia, middle east due to geographical location and then to Europe due to lower manufacturing costs utilised in India.
The three dominant car firms in the passenger car segment are Maruti-Suzuki India, Hyundai motor India (a wholly owned subsidiary of Hyundai of South Korea) and TATA Motors. Combined, these three firms control around 90% of the passenger car market share (Bardalai & Nicholls 2012, p.5).

Suzuki’s Entrance into the Indian market
“By partnering with Maruti Udyog Ltd, founded by Indira Gandhi’s son Sanjay, Suzuki not only understood the importance of elite government relationships but the opportunity the Indian market provided” (Masanori, 2012 p. 7).
Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) was formed in 1981 to meet the nation’s rising demand for personal transportation amidst failing public transport systems. MUL looked to partner with a reputed foreign automaker in order to leverage the partner’s technological and management skills. After considering a few competitors the Indian government decided to partner with Suzuki the Japanese automaker on account of its track record and capabilities in the small car segment as well as its ability in transferring Japanese management style which frequently is attributed to the success of many companies (Moon & Kwon 2010 p.610). The small car segment was of particular interest for the government as small cars are fuel efficient, but the government also looked for cars that have the ability to handle the Indian roads and hence had this as a key evaluating factor.
Suzuki’s motivation in entering as a joint venture into the Indian market rather than waiting until it was able to enter as a wholly owned subsidiary can surround the fact that the Indian market is complex to navigate especially with differing political arena than that of Japan with a large cultural distance between the Japanese and Indians. Furthermore Suzuki was small comparatively and lacked the vast amount of manpower and resources required to enter India as a WOS hence a joint venture was inevitable. The Indian government saw Suzuki size as advantageous as they were able to engage in more aggressive negotiations with the Japanese car maker. 
Suzuki, like many Japanese firms or indeed foreign firms entering new markets may have taken a complex analysis when entering the Indian market in terms of level of ownership. Typically Japanese firms entering foreign market take an incremental approach starting with exporting to the target market, however since this was not an option due to the heavy duties imposed by the Indian government on imports of cars, Suzuki forewent this stage and proceeded to a Joint venture; However in typical Japanese manner, they  increased their commitment to the venture incrementally starting with a 26%  of equity  to ownership to 40% five years later and 50% 9 years later (Malhotra & Sinharay 2013 p.1). This incremental entrance into the market alleviated Suzuki’s risk concerns; however, it may not have been the right strategy had Suzuki entered into the Indian market at a later stage. According to research done by Masanori (2012 p.3&4) one success factors for entering the Indian market is making large investments at entry, something Korean companies have been more aggressive with than the Japanese. Hence, the joint venture of Suzuki with MUL had a profound effect in raising the profile of the organisation in India without the risk of a majority or equal equity investment. Other foreign firms committed large sums in order to gain governmental support.
 Furthermore, the entrance choice likely undertook what many academics term as transaction cost approach where by strategies look to devise the best outcome possible where by the cost of exploiting proprietary assets is minimised whilst maximising the rent generation revenue of those assets (Meyer, Wright & Pruthi, 2009 p.570). The Japanese may have felt that partnering with the highest levels in the India would aid in protecting their proprietary assets far more than partnering with a private firm.
The Japanese firm’s contractual ability to increase its ownership in the firm clearly demonstrates that they intended to control the joint venture as much as possible. Their planned entry hence can be identified as one that exploits the advantages of partnering with an entity that would serve to reduce the liability of foreignness (LOF) which impacts “…all elements of the international business environment…” (Sethi & Guisinger 2002, p.223) whilst maintaining the control needed to operate as they see fit, leveraging their knowledge and skills acquired in their home country.
We can conclude that Suzuki Japan entered in a joint venture with the Indian government in order to navigate a complex market with harsh operating environment in a relatively seamless manner, yet it strived to control the operations and planned to do so in the long term. The Indian government saw the merits and skills that Suzuki had and therefore were more concerned with providing the nation with personal transport than with controlling the company. They acted in an encouraging manner and did not have a profit generation agenda but a political one. Serving the people would make them more politically resilient in future elections. 

Political Environment
The Indian political environment, although the world’s largest democracy is extremely bureaucratic in nature where trade is concerned. The government has often acted with a protectionist view in order to serve its local companies and fend away foreign entities. Foreign firms where kept from bidding on projects that may impact national security which could be viewed tolerable, however they also were kept away from less sensitive projects by the government failing to disclose important requirements for the bid or by only publishing the bids in small local outlets were foreign firms are unlikely to see them (Shenkar & Luo 200, p.46).
In the automotive industry things were no different, prior to the lifting of heavy duties in 1983 (Malhotra & Sinharay 2013 p.1) the market was only represented by the local players, the duties that increased the cost of the unit significantly were too large for most foreign car makers to enter the market whilst remaining profitable. Furthermore, protocol barriers to the Indian market are highly criticised and impose undue pressure on foreign car makers (Reed, 2012).  These protocols (in the form of endless licenses and needless tests on car horns for example) may have in fact been a key motivator for Suzuki to choose to partner with the government rather than a private entity. It is presumed that protocols would have been easier to navigate within the government if the government had a stake in developing the business.
Further problems faced by the government protectionist approach is the world marketplace isolation which restricted investment and entrance of new technologies needed in modern car manufacturing (Kumar et. al., 1996 p.176) this impacted entrance of foreign component manufacturing firms which directly raised the cost of automakers wishing to assemble cars in India. The lack of availability of components places a need for imports which can be subjected to heavy duties and transportation costs cancelling out the benefits of cheap labour market.
 Suzuki’s early entrance to the market meant that it set up its operations transferring vital success factors such as technology and management styles in time for the liberalisation benefitting for substantial first mover advantages. Suzuki very possibly had, through informal channels of communication understood that whilst at first certain government policies may limit production range but in the long term liberalisation (which came about in the 1990’s) was an aspect to look forward to. Whilst competitors scatter to set up in India Suzuki was already there, ready to take the next course of action and develop its business to the next level in production. In this instance tariffs and protectionism served the venture well in the sense it gave Suzuki a significant head start when liberalisation took place.

 Economical Liberalisation
Economic liberalisation in the early 90’s transformed many sectors within the Indian market (Sáez 2009, p.1137). Among those sectors affected by the liberalisation was the financial sector which had a profound impact on purchasing power in general and effectively revolutionised the auto loans segment of the business. Owning a car  became within reach of many who benefitted from the gradual increased competition in this segment and the liberalisation of the manufacturing sector (Malhotra & Sinharay 2013 p.3). This also had a positive impact on the automotive industry in the view of increased sales, partly as the GDP increased with more people employed in these sectors as foreign players entered the market and partly due to the increased competition in this sector that encouraged aggressive pricing and more tailor made cars for the new emerging urbanised middle class, once unseen in a country previously offering little other than agriculture for the majority of its people.
India’s membership of the world trade organisation grants it lower tariffs in certain developed countries through the generalised system of preferences (GSP); this with the liberalisation of the market compounded with low cost of labour makes it an attractive manufacturing and exporting hub.  Maruti Suzuki, enjoys these privileges, with over 30% of the company’s exports reaching the European Union at an average of 3.5% less tax it’s in an enviable position (Banergee, 2013). If Suzuki exported the same cars from Japan it would incur a sizeable cost difference to its operation that may impact its competitiveness. However, having enjoyed the privileges of GSP in Europe for many years the system is due to change in January 2014 and the organisation is likely to face challenges in its pricing strategy, were a balance between profitability margins and consumers perception of value are likely to be questioned. Furthermore the change will cast a shadow on foreign manufacturers who need to revaluate the cost benefit of operating in India. 

Currency Fluctuation
The Indian rupee has seen severe weakening against the dollar in the past twelve months impacting negatively on the auto industry that relies heavily on imported fuel. The fuel subsidies given by the government are gradually lifting making running a car far more expensive than previous years.  The high interest rates that the government have implemented in bid to defend the declining the currency and combat inflation are further agitating the situation.  It is estimated that approximately 80% of all car purchases are financed (Reuters 2013); hence not only running a car has become more expensive but also buying one.  

Cultural differences
Navigating host country culture is imperative to the success of any foreign entity.  The high cultural distance between the Japanese and Indian culture in the form of language, religion, attitude towards work whereby the Japanese have an extreme devotion to the organisation above that of the family and vice versa for Indians leads Japanese organisations to take a stringent cultural risk assessment. It is of utmost importance for any organisation to be accepted socially and have the capability to adapt within its environment and although local hire bridges some of the distance, effective communication with head office is conducive to success (Shenkar & Luo 2007, p.281). Further to the impact of culture on entry strategy, a comprehensive understanding of society and its requirements induces creativity and hence enables an organisation to anticipate the needs of consumers prior to competition and reap favourable returns. 
The Japanese and Indians share common cultural traits and indeed differences. Both societies are high on power distance, which may have aided in the negotiation stage of Suzuki and MUL as everyone is likely to have been somewhat polite and not blunt like for example the Anglo-Saxons who were also in the run for the partnership.  The view of collectivism is commonly shared, although the Japanese are the most individualistic in Asia they do rank low in comparison to most of the world, so do the Indians. However the loyalty in each culture differs, the Japanese are devoted to their organisation and place it at the top of their priority list whilst the Indians place more priority on family and friendship relationships.  None the less the understanding of Japanese companies that people are not merely motivated by their salary and relationships bring about satisfaction is a critical factor that many European and American companies struggle with. Japanese organisations are loyal to their employees; many Japanese believe a job is a job for life so much so that they have no compulsory retirement age. The organisations place much emphasis on training and ensuring that they derive the best result out of each employee regardless of position and they work loosely with job descriptions. Team work is of an imperative attribute for both the Indians and Japanese, they both arguably dislike attracting individual attention and prefer being assigned tasks and rewarded as a group. Nepotism is rare in the Japanese culture yet widely accepted in India, especially since most companies retain some family control and hence nepotism is expected.  Suzuki’s assumption of management may have created conflicts in this regard, especially if the management recognised under performing workforce was onboard and lacking the technical skills needed to realise the company’s vision for efficiency.
Maruti-Suzuki suffered ugly conflicts with the trade unions; the firm recognised one union and refused to recognise a second one. Employees at the company’s Manesar plant  demanded a separate union to the one that was already in place, The Maruti Udyog Kamgar Unioun (MUKU) which was dominated by those who work at the Gurgaon plant (Sen, 2011 p.192). Employees at the Menesar plant went on a wild cat strike were some were dismissed. As typical Indian cultural collectivism and loyalty is ingrained in social and family relationships, workers in competitor automaker plants threatened to strike if their organisations did not interfere favourably, hence the problem became an industry problem rather than a company problem. 
The government backed the organisations and ruled in favour of ‘no strike’ policy. The trade unions demand for collective bargaining could have been better understood if the organisation took a cultural perspective of the problem. In fact there was no demand other than to form a union where the workers felt that they could participate as their distance from the other plant unioun was large and their grievances differed. In fact Honda motorcycles and Scooters in 2005 faced a similar demand which resulted in a strike, and so did Rico Auto in 2009 (Sen, 2011 p.196).
Better understanding of the social needs fulfilled by the union could have alleviated a recurring problem for Maruti-Suzuki.  The Japanese company failed to be culturally savvy with the Indian employee and acted with horror at the fact that they merely wanted a second union, as in Japan unionism is low and  strikes are extremely rare, the devotion to the organisation far outweighs the benefits of unionism.  
The recurring problem with the unions is rarely forgotten, it started in the 2000s and continuous to be a topic discussed today, the MD & CEO of Maruti-Suzuki India in a recent interview referred to the problem as a “…sad case of mis-communication with our workforce led to such perennial problems in the past two years.” (Ayukawa, 2013 p. 4). This indicates that the company is still struggling to bridge the cultural gap between management and workforce.
 Maruti-Suzuki, despite all its problems with the workforce, seems to have finally understood the importance of the community ties to its blue collar workers and has leveraged this connection by offering them the opportunity to contribute to the company’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects by volunteering in projects the organisation is active in such as education in local schools. 
Such tasks were previously only undertaken by management and professionals (e.g. engineers). Having the CSR involve the workshop staff not only increases the company’s internal public relations stance but allows them to proudly represent their company in a manner in line with cultural expectations and hence induces more loyalty to the company. The organisation initiated its CSR assignments four years ago (Bhattacharyya, 2013) which arguably is considerably later than some would expect given over two decades of operation in India.
A problem infiltrating culture, politics and even the economical spheres of India is corruption and the system that sometimes seems to be built on bribery. Corruption is essentially a barrier to trade, organisations that cannot be involved in bribery from a legislative, ethical or cultural stance, may find it extremely difficult to operate effectively in India. With a low CPI index of 3.4 (Coleman, 2013 p.172) entering and operating in India causes an abundance of problems for foreign organisations especially those that come from less corrupt countries such as Japan which has a CPI index of 7.7 (Coleman, 2013 p.170). Corruption in India and the culture of bribery is well understood and utilized by local firms although not publicly condoned it often goes unpunished. This increases the entry risk to India and the costs that companies entail which some believe could be equivalent to more than 20% tax burden on organisations coming from a low corruption country (Shenkar & Luo 2007, 522).
In Suzuki’s case, partnering with the government and access to the highest levels could have mitigated the problem substantially, as no one realistically would have had the audacity to ask for bribes when they know that the government are involved and can utilize the laws that punish such behavior. The laws that are in place to fight this economically draining cultural trait although present are hardly used because the reporting of corruption is low attributing to the level of acceptance and the stance of ‘that’s how people do business in India.

Expatriates In India 
There is a substantial bureaucracy to entering and exiting India for expats which act as a hindrance for foreign entities wishing to bring some skilled, talented experts. This hindrance although does not stop those people from coming it does discourage them from returning. Returning expats can have a profound benefit to foreign entities as they possess the knowledge to navigate the Indian environment from their previous assignment yet may have updated their knowledge and technical expertise in more technologically developed countries, hence instead of them passing through the stages of culture shock and acceptance prior to contributing to the organisation’s progress, they can dissipate their knowledge immediately. Those who have a good experience in a country are likely to return and those who like many foreigners feel somewhat entrapped by the bureaucracy normally do not wish to do so. 
Many expats feel the need to present a set of documents prior to departing India is an infringement on their civil rights, as they should (provided they have remained on the right side of the law) be able to leave anytime they want to their home country, with only presenting their passports. The renewal of an expat visa which must be done yearly can take up to two months in which time expats are not permitted to leave. In some cases this causes irreversible emotional consequences due to a sick relative dying without the expat being able to return home.
In fact bureaucracy and the need for excessive information by both local and foreign companies in India is said to leave a ‘bad taste’ for many expats. Banks, even international banks require a history status before opening an account and can debate the procedure endlessly, house wives are rarely able to open an account easily as they cannot provide a stable income, which most people cannot comprehend since they have accounts in their home countries sometimes with the same bank. Furthermore the bureaucracy in transferring funds out of India cause endless problems whereby expats have to apply for special permission each time they want to transfer money out of the country. Some expats have to go through the ordeal on monthly basis since they maybe supporting family members or paying child support (in cases of divorce). 
Conclusion
Entering the Indian market as a minority equity holder whilst maintaining a long term view of eventually becoming a majority holder and assuming full management control Suzuki was able to study, learn  and navigate the Indian market in a structured manner an opportunity most competitors dream about in a market complex to enter. Suzuki’s solid political backing enabled it to overcome the hurdles that even local companies are challenged by. The government stood by Suzuki in times of trade union turmoil and ruled in favour of the industry in general indicating their commitment to the foreign entities. Although culturally the two countries differ considerably Suzuki’s ability to overcome those differences is evident as the company is operating successfully in India more than two decades after the initial entry.  Figures show that Maruti-Suzuki continuously dominated the market of passenger cars with around 45% of the market share (Moon & Kwon 2010, p.606). Furthermore, although Maruti-Suzuki at times was challenged in its ability to handle matters relating to comprehensive understanding of its employees, it is clearly turning the page with its increased community ties and further understanding of its work force. Such measures should induce a more motivated, loyal workforce.
The opportunities offered to the company as an early entrant may arguably be central to the organisation’s success, not only did it make a company relatively small grow to a level envied by its competitors but also enabled it to enter a market it may have otherwise missed out on. Suzuki possibly could not have stood the fierce competition that it would have faced had it entered after liberalization as wholly owned subsidiary, with its size and human resources too small for the Indian market. Yet Suzuki, learnt, made mistakes, developed new models to serve the Indians all while its competition were at bay. The organisation was solidly ingrained in India and demonstrated high resilience by the time the competition flooded in.


 References
Ayukawa K.  (2013), ‘Maruti to Retain Focus on Small Cars for Growth in India’, The Economic Times.  July 29th p. 4

Banerjee R. (2013) ‘Auto export to Europe set to get more expensive’ CNBC TV 18. [online] http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/cnbc-tv18-comments/auto-exports-to-europe-set-to-get-more-expensive_829411.html (Accessed on 26th July 2013)
Bardalai A. & Nicholls A. (2012) ‘Industry Reports from Economist Intelligent Unit’ The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd 2012. Jun, pp.1-12      
Bhattacharyya R. (2013), ‘Maruti extends corporate social responsibility initiative to shop floor’ The Economic Times. [online] http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-03-05/news/37469798_1_e-parivartan-programme-corporate-social-responsibility-maruti-suzuki-india (Accessed 28th July 2013)
Coleman D. (2013), 'Corruption Perceptions Index', India Country Review, July pp. 169-176
Kumar A., Turcq D., Mercer G. & Narasimhan L. (1996) 'Indian automotive components: The competitive realities', Mckinsey Quarterly. (1) March pp. 176-180

Malhotra G., Sinharay, S. (2013) ‘Maruti Suzuki - Reigning Emperor of Indian Automobile Industry’ Journal of Case Research. 4(1), June, pp.1-38

Masanori K., (2012) ‘Strategies for Japanese companies in India’ RIETI Discussion Paper. Series 12-E-064. October pp.1-29. [online] www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/12e064.pdf (Accessed 26th July 2013)
Meyer K., Wright M. & Pruthi, S. (2009), 'Managing knowledge in foreign entry strategies: a resource-based analysis', Strategic Management Journal. 30(5) May pp. 557-574
Moon H., Kwon D. (2010) ‘Entry Mode choice between Wholly-Owned Subsidiary and Joint Venture: A Case Study of Automotive Industry in India’ International Journal of Performability Engineering. 6 (6), November, pp.605-614
Reed J., (2012) ‘Europe’s car markers that hit out at India trade deal’ Financial Times [online] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8fa89e2-490d-11e1-88f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2a5TWN9ah (Accessed 26th July)

Reuters (2013) ‘Car sales in India on worst sales streak in history’ Hindustantimes.com [online] http://www.hindustantimes.com/Autos/Latest-News/Car-sales-in-India-on-worst-sales-streak-in-history/Article1-1057916.aspx (Accessed 29th July 2013)

Sen R. (2011) ‘Industrial Relations at Maruti-Suzuki’ The Indian Journal Of Industrial Relations. 47(2) October pp.191-203
Sethi, D. & Guisinger S. (2002), 'Liability of foreignness to competitive advantage: How multinational enterprises cope with the international business environment', Journal Of International Management. 8(3) January pp. 223-240
Shenkar, O. & Luo, Y. (2007) International business. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
US Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Country Comparison:: GDP (purchasing power parity’.













TESCO - Accounting Practises and their impact on business

TESCO PLC Accounting practices report
Introduction
Tesco was founded in 1919 by a man named Jack Cohen from a market stall in East London. Tesco has since grown into 12 countries and employs over 530,000 people (Tesco Plc, n.d.) it is the largest UK retailer and ranks third world wide by annual sales behind Wal-Mart and Carrefour (Biesada, n.d.).
Although Tesco initially was a food retailer it has expanded its business to selling much more than food including finance, mobiles, clothing, furniture and electronics. Tesco as a retailer will be the main focus of this report.
The report will discuss various accounting techniques that Tesco undertakes to ensure the success of its business; these techniques will be analysed.

Budgeting Processes
Virtually all food and beverage organisations in the UK use budgets for planning and control (Abdel-Kader&Luther 2006, p.343). Budgets should be linked to the organisation’s mission and objectives (Atrill & McLaney, 2012p. 190) hence when contemplating Tesco’s mission statement which is to "create value for customers to earn their lifetime loyalty” an evaluation of the budgets alignment can take place.
Tesco’s drive to bring value to its customers, has been linked with setting budgets that are focused on cutting costs wherever possible and rewarding those who are loyal to the organisation by implementing a loyalty program named The Club Card. 
Furthermore, Tesco has been known to cut profit margins in order to reflect savings for its customers, (Vizard, 2013 p.3), in 2011 Tesco found that it was losing market share and responded by more price discounting and £5 rebates for every £40 spent which represented more than their actual margins (Grunys, 2012), this leads to illustrate that Tesco tends to re-forecast regularly, they are able to adapt to the fast moving environment by changing their budget and using information relevant at a certain time, however continuous change in the budget could be detrimental to their share price as cutting profit margins sporadically eludes to the fact that management encompasses poor forecasting skills.  

Tesco follows discretionary budgeting, therefore sets its budgets on previous years with some adjustments for any changes that may affect its budget. Tesco has been known to aspire for 3%-4% sales growth each year, however this was adjusted in 2008 to only 2% sales growth for the upcoming year due to the economic downturn at the time (The grocer, 2008).

Budgeting for a decrease in sales growth is preferable to sudden price cuts or rebates as those tend to hurt the operating profit margins pressuring the share price of the organisation and therefore leaving it at a competitive disadvantage.




  • Budgeting with suppliers

Tesco engages in collaborative forecasting with some of its suppliers. This has proved essential to ensure no loss in sales or overstocking and that the supply chains are in coherence. One of Tesco’s suppliers the brewer Coors indicated that joint forecasts owned by both parties as well as one meeting to re-forecast demand if embarking on a promotion has led to 97% accuracy rate (Watson, 2005 p.8). This process leads to decreased levels of waste as the product is perishable hence cutting on costs and yet ensuring no loss in sales due to under stocking which hence maximises potential revenue. 

  • Operational cost cutting

Tesco’s operational cost cutting in recent years due to the decline in the global economy resulted in what some describe as consumer unfriendly attitudes, the stores lacked effective maintenance, whilst customer service declined compounded by the horse meat scandal and fines for misleading pricing led to the organisation start ceding 30% of its market share to rivals (Katsenelson, 2013). HSBC in a note to their investors (December 2012) advised clients to decrease their Tesco shares and revalue the share down from 400p to 340p (Vizard, 2013).
The operational cost cutting could have placed Tesco in a vicious circle where losing consumers puts further pressure on profit margins resulting in further operational cost cutting and so forth.  

A reset in margins in such instances can aid the organisation to align itself back with its mission statement and it balanced scorecard mentioned later in the report.
In an interview with the CFO Laurie Mcllwee on Tesco’s corporate website (Tesco Plc, 2013) he states that the organisation aims to be more cash generative, hence investment spending is more disciplined, however the organisation recognises that failing in its core success area naming the UK operations is detrimental and therefore they have invested £1 billion to turn around the customer experience.


Costing processes & Working Capital

  • Inventory 
Tesco is extremely efficient in cutting costs and apply it to managing their inventory effectively. Therefore Tesco is conscience of managing their working capital so as that their trade payables are higher than their receivables; in essence Tesco receives cash for a trolley load of groceries before paying for it (Atrill & McLaney, 2012 p. 437)
  • Supply Chain costs
A key component of Tesco’s cost base is the sourcing of their inventory and delivering it to their outlets, the stages that encompass this process are as follows:


Procurement
Tesco’s ability to cut costs from its distributors is heavily attributed to its size and ability to exercise superior bargaining power, furthermore Tesco is able to leverage economies of scale in markets where it operates on a large scale such as the UK.
Storage
It is evident that Tesco holds low levels of inventory as their stock turnover ratio according to their annual reports is approximately 17 which is above industry average normally hovering around the 12 yet its below that of Sainsbury’s which is 21.8 (Bloomberg Business week, 2013). This suggests that although Tesco is performing above industry average and is therefore able to take advantage of its working capital and invest the cash in other areas of the business, there is still room for improvement in this area. If Sainsbury’s can have a significantly higher figure for stock turnover then Tesco may engage in benchmarking in order to realise better inventory turnover processes.
Transportation & logistics
This component of costs encompasses the inbound stock delivery to stores from warehouses as well as the outbound stock delivery directly to end users through Tesco’s home delivery scheme.
The key cost drivers in the transportation element would include fuel, depreciation of the delivery vans and labour. There is evidence that Tesco implements ABC costing for the outbound delivery of goods as it engages in levying the delivery charges on to its customers hence treating the activity as a cost driver. Geographical locations are taken into account and those who order delivery have to make a minimum purchase to enable Tesco to break-even on the process and make a profit. In a country where labour and petrol charges are high, this type of costing is essential, although competitors may try to compete on delivery charges, Tesco is comfortable in the knowledge that they own the largest operation and delivery depots in the UK hence it would not make sense for competitors to compete on the basis of delivery charges when Tesco can undercut them.
Direct & Indirect fixed cost
The direct fixed costs of running the retail outlet include leasing charges of the premises (if leased) otherwise an increment of the purchase price, utilities and labour.
In the sale and leaseback scheme mentioned earlier, Tesco capped the rental for 20 years which alleviates the risk of inflation and eases the budgeting for this cost. Furthermore, Tesco constantly seeks technological advances in order to cut its labour costs, such example would be the self checkout counters whereby no check out staff are needed but customers engage in registering the products and paying for them by themselves. Future technology is likely to impact these costs positively.

The indirect costs that Tesco is subjected to would include, head office salaries, machinery purchases and marketing expenses. These costs may be allocated on the size of each outlet or on the basis of sales revenue in order to reflect a fair burden on each store.

Management Accounting
  • The shop
It is estimated that £1 in every £8 spent on retail in the UK is spent in Tesco (Phillips, 2007 p.143), therefore the organisation like many has a wealth of information that needs to be communicated internally and externally efficiently in order to asses effectively its marketing strategy as well as its costs and revenues.
Tesco uses a system named ‘The Shop’ it’s an extranet system that enables the organisation as well as some of its suppliers (although with limited access) understand the purchasing trends of its club card customers (a number representing 13 million homes). This system allows full tracking of the stores revenues by product, customer groups and geographical location (Phillips, 2007 p.144), the system also allows tracking of increased purchases when promotions take place which would allow management accountants to assess advertising budget’s returns. This system also allows for better capital allocation to stores when faced with capital rationing decision making.
Tesco’s closer integration and transparency with its suppliers through information gathering and dissipation encourages store management and line managers in owning their individual budgets as they are closely aligning them with the suppliers’ capabilities in delivering the product as well as the suppliers’ anticipated demand.
  • Balanced Scorecard
Tesco’s balanced scorecard is very visible to employees and simple to understand ‘The wheel’ (Tesco Plc. n.d.) as it is referred to ensures that the core success factors for the organisation that ultimately result in maximising the shareholders’ wealth are communicated effectively.
In an aggressive, competitive environment the engagement of the employees in attaining the ultimate goals mentioned on the wheel are imperative hence its effective simplistic form. The wheel incorporates a fifth dimension naming the community in order to fulfil the recent demands by the general public by which large organisations are expected to engage in corporate social responsibility and be ‘kind’ to their surrounding community.
  • KPIs
Tesco employs a number of KPIs to access its financial and operational performance.
Tesco like many organisations expresses its financial objectives in terms of target ROCE and  aims at increasing it year on year. The organisation also monitors closely the growth in underlying profit before tax as a main KPI in order to assess the health of its profitability growth plans (Tesco plc. 2013)
Tesco has relatively flat gearing ratios in the past 3 years, it maintained a ratio of around 38% which is a decline from 2009/2010 figures where it reflected 54% gearing ratio (Tesco plc, 2013). The organisation clearly views deleveraging to a 38% and maintaining this figure as a key performance indicator. Tesco’s sale and leaseback scheme as well as bond issuing mentioned later is clearly more strategically aligned with its ambition to deleverage. 

Capital decision making
  • Acquisition T&S stores, UK
Planning permissions and governmental regulations can hinder expansion in the UK. Therefore Tesco’s decision to allocate capital in acquiring an already existing smaller grocer group has proved successful in succumbing to the difficulties of entering new locations.
Tesco’s knowledge of the British consumer’s spending habits and requirements is pivotal in its capital decision making, furthermore its satisfactory provision of lower prices to consumers than those offered by T&S solidified its case for the acquisition by the office of fair trading (office of fair trading, n.d.)
  • Tesco’s International expansion – Acquisition of Fresh & Easy US stores
Although Tesco has enjoyed enormous success in the UK market, its international expansions have not always presented healthy decision making. 
Tesco invested an abundance of resources to enter the US market only to pull out with a $1.5 billion in losses (Sctweek, 2013 p.3) in 7 years. Although Tesco conducted market research for ready to eat meals which were the focus of their shops in the US, they failed to appreciate the challenges involved in changing the habits of the consumer that were a key success factor. Furthermore the timing of Tesco’s entry into the US in 2007 was disaster ridden as the US market embarked on a deep recession and consumers became more cost conscious hence preferring to cook raw foods as a cheaper option (Heffernan, 2013 p.257). It can be therefore concluded that Tesco failed to forecast the effects of a possible economic downturn on its US capital investment decision making processes.
  • China
Tesco’s near failure in China has much to do with allocating capital at either end of the country on both coasts leaving a black hole in the middle hence difficulty in leveraging economies of scale due to transportation costs and lack of brand recognition. In essence their Chinese operations were far from consolidated and could have been in two different countries. Tesco yet again allocated capital for a merger with the largest Chinese grocery retailer who enjoys 200 stores across the country, this decision gives Tesco a 20% ownership of a much larger entity which is more likely to succeed and more importantly allows it to self finance moving forward (Katsenelson, 2013) implicating its cash flows positively in an economy that is cash strapped, hence alleviating any liquidity issues for the organisation.  
  • Tesco’s Technology Investment
Tesco has recently announced £1 billion planned investment mainly in technology (Vizard, 2013). The organisation recognises the fast paced technological age and has invested in an app that enables customers to check the latest offers, furthermore the organisation’s first mover advantage (in home delivery) that has served the organisation a multitude of success is being upgraded through technology by offering same day delivery service. Coupled with the technological upgrades Tesco is investing in more distribution centres to serve its online shopping promises. Tesco has also invested in offering their own brand tablet which the organisation claims to be the highest selling tablet in their stores, outselling those of Apple’s IPad and Amazon kindles according to their Chief Philip Clarke (Vizard, 2013), the tablet is likely to impact the Tesco shopping experience in future. 

Capital Acquisition
Organisations primarily use debt or equity based products for financing capital and their capital structure debt equity ratio indicates the composition of the capital structure. High leveraging poses financial risk due to the high levels of interest on debt that need to be paid. Furthermore should an organisation file for bankruptcy a high number of debtors need to be paid prior to shareholders hence posing risk to shareholders who may not receive the value of their shares.
Currently Tesco has a gearing ratio of 38% where as one of its competitors, Sainsbury’s has a gearing ratio is 46%, furthermore Tesco has a market capitalisation of almost 4 times that of Sainsbury’s hence it is in healthy position to raise capital via debt issuance and bonds.
  • Bonds
Tesco issued bonds in August 2013 secured by some of its UK stores in order to fulfil its expansion plans. The bonds were sold out of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that will use the fund in order to purchase seven new stores, which then will be leased by Tesco subsidiaries (Euroweek, 2013 p.57).  Tesco’s ability to raise £493million is credit to its attractiveness as an investment to the bond markets and also is a reflection of its stability from a credit lending perspective.
The organisations leaseback agreement alleviates pressure off its cash flows whilst allowing it to expand in new locations. 
  • Financing
Tesco engages in different methods when expanding globally, in some countries it creates a merger with a local player in home territory it engages in building its own stores and in other territories it engages in borrowing for its development, although on occasions with a local partner.
In Czech republic in 2008 Tesco and Multi Development (subsidiary of Multi Corporation) acquired financing by Hypo Real Estate Bank International AG in order to develop a new city centre anchored by Tesco (property magazine, 2008).
Tesco’s solid brand and experience makes it an attractive client for financing.

  • Selling the real estate and leasing back 
In 2007, Tesco realised that in a cash strapped economy the opportunity cost of maintaining cash tied up in its real-estate holdings is far too high. Tesco needed the funds to upgrade other aspects of its operations, especially to maintain its technological progression; therefore Tesco sold 21 stores representing 3% of its total real estate holding to British Land, on a leaseback agreement, with a cap on rental increases (Sctweek, 2007), this is aligned with the organisation’s objective of becoming more cash generative
  • Equity 
Tesco is a publicly listed company and trades in the London stock exchange and therefore has the capability of issuing shares in order to acquire capital, however since Tesco has a target earnings per share closely monitored and forms the basis of its KPIs it must ensure that no extra shares are issued that would jeopardise its EPS price. Furthermore the organisation is constantly under pressure to raise this figure by creating value for its shareholders.

Conclusion

Tesco’s aggressive presence in the UK market is the core of its success, it has let its operations be jeopardised by operational cost cutting and lack of capital investment during the economic downturn, whilst focusing on International expansions.

Some of Tesco’s international expansions have been extremely successful whilst others have failed to acquire the target return on investment, it can also be concluded that Tesco is more likely to succeed internationally if partnering with an experienced local entity. 

Tesco’s turn around in the past year when refocusing on its UK operations makes it an attractive investment with healthy cash flows. Understanding that the UK operations must not be compromised due to international expansions and that capital investment especially in technology needs to be made constantly will serve Tesco high returns in the long term.


Research Method
All of the research undertaken for this report has been secondary in nature. Tesco’s corporate website has contributed a vast amount of in depth knowledge which formed the basis of the report.
Further research and reading was undertaken on the industry as a whole and analysis was based on the author’s academic knowledge and research into the topics discussed.


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